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A STEP BACK FOR TURKEY, TWO STEPS
FORWARD IN THE REPATRIATION EFFORTS
OF ITS CULTURAL PROPERTY
Kelvin D. Collado
ABSTRACT
In recent years, Turkey has increasingly sought the repatriation of
important cultural properties it believes are best understood and belong
within its borders. Claiming rights to all sorts of cultural property,
irrespective of when the cultural property left the country, and without regard
to whether the property is truly of Turkish heritage, Turkey has taken a hard
line approach by threatening to prevent museums all over the world from
conducting research in Turkey and excavating and exporting cultural
property from Turkey to other places in the world. Considering the important
and complicated issues raised by Turkey, and the country’s desire to
repatriate cultural property it believes to be part of its cultural heritage,
Turkey should engage museums with a softer tone, a more nuanced eye, and
with the openness to enter into voluntary agreements much in the same way
Italy has successfully done in the past.

INTRODUCTION
The illicit trade of cultural property remains a pervasive problem for the
international community. 1 The battle over the ownership of cultural property
is typically waged between countries of origin and foreign museums. The
countries of origin, where the cultural property physically originated, argue
cultural property should be repatriated because it was obtained illegally by
foreign museums. In response, the museums contend they have properly
acquired the property on display and have sufficient documentation to
support their claims. This debate boils down to one major question: who
actually owns the centuries-old cultural property in question, especially in
light of many countries shifting borders?
Countries have adopted both international agreements and national laws
to protect against the illicit trade of cultural property and to provide ways for
countries to seek repatriation of cultural property no longer within their

1.

See Dianne Penn, General Assembly Reviews Efforts to Curb Illegal Trade in
Cultural
Property,
UNITED
NATIONS
RADIO,
http://www.unmultimedia.org/radio/english/2012/12/general-assembly-reviewsefforts-to-curb-illegal-trade-in-cultural-property/ (Dec. 12, 2012) (reporting on the
current illegal trade situation and introducing a draft resolution on returning
illegally taken cultural property to the rightful country).
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borders. The main international agreement governing the repatriation of
cultural property between countries is the UNESCO Convention. Simply
put, this agreement established a bright-line rule that governs when museums
and art galleries are in legal possession, and in turn have appropriately
acquired, cultural property. Under the UNESCO Convention, a foreign
country has a claim for any cultural property that was illegally exported out
of its country after 1970 and, thus, that property shall not be acquired by
museums or art galleries; 3 any cultural property that was outside of its
country of origin prior to 1970 is not subject to the requirements of the
UNESCO Convention, preventing countries of origin from having legal
remedies in seeking the repatriation of cultural property.
Turkey is a country of rich cultural heritage with an increasing interest
in establishing itself as a cultural powerhouse. 4 In recent years, Turkey has
increasingly demanded the repatriation of cultural property it believes
belongs in the country. Turkey is noted as being part of a cultural nationalist 5
vanguard, its recent actions symptomatic of the country’s renewed search for
a national identity. Turkey is now stepping up its efforts by aggressively
going after museums and seeking the return of all cultural property it
believes belong in Turkey, irrespective of when the property left the country,
including instances where Turkey cannot prove when the cultural property
left Turkish soil. In doing so, Turkey cites an Ottoman-era law passed in
1906, which bans the export of cultural artifacts. Turkey has been somewhat
successful in repatriating cultural property, such as when it convinced
Germany’s Pergamon Museum to return a 3,000 year-old sphinx. 6 However,
Turkey’s strategy of demanding the return of objects without any
accompanying evidence to support its claims has made museums wary of
trusting Turkey’s assertions and returning the property at issue. By
aggressively going after museums in this fashion, Turkey is effectively
ignoring the guidelines set up by the UNESCO convention, of which it is a
signee. Another complicating factor raised by Turkey’s claims is that Turkey
has, in the past, claimed legal ownership of property that Turkey has
arguably looted from other countries. All of this begs the question who is
the legitimate owner of these cultural property and what steps can a country
take to ensure the repatriation of its cultural property.

2.
3.

4.

5.

6.

See infra Parts I and II (discussing 1954 Hague Convention, UNESCO, and
UNIDROIT).
There are a few caveats to this UNESCO’s requirement, mainly that countries
usually have to show proof of when the cultural artifact was removed from the
country.
See Dan Bilefsky, Seeking Return Of Art, Turkey Jolts Museums, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
1, 2012, at A1 (discussing Turkey’s campaign to reclaim Turkish cultural artifacts
from Western European and American museums).
Countries that are cultural nationalist believe that cultural property belongs, and is
best understood, in its country of origin. For a general discussion on cultural
nationalism see John H. Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking about Cultural
Property, 80 AM. J. INT’L L. 831, 831-32 (1986)
See Bilefsky, supra note 4.
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This paper will engage in a careful discussion on whether Turkey has a
legitimate claim to the cultural property it is demanding repatriation of under
the 1906 Ottoman-era law declaring that “all antiquities found in or on public
or private lands were state property and could not be taken out of [the]
country.” 7 This law remained in full force and effect until 1973, when a new
law was passed, again declaring that all antiquities so found were property
of the state. 8 This paper will then conclude by arguing that Turkey’s current
efforts will, in large part, ultimately prove unsuccessful. Instead, Turkey
would be better served by mimicking Italy’s successful cooperative and
nuanced model of repatriating cultural property.

BACKGROUND
A.

Defining Cultural Property

A universal definition of cultural property does not exist because of a
lack of international agreement with respect to passing uniform and binding
law. 9 However, certain international agreements have sought to define
cultural property. The 1954 Hague Convention, written under the backdrop
of protecting cultural property during times of war, defines cultural property
as:
“[M]ovable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural
heritage of every people, such as monuments of architecture, art or history,
whether religious or secular; archaeological sites; groups of buildings which,
as a whole, are of historical or artistic interest; works of art; manuscripts,
books and other objects of artistic, historical or archaeological interest; as
well as scientific collections and important collections of books or archives
or of reproductions of the property defined above; buildings whose main and
effective purpose is to preserve or exhibit the movable cultural property . . .
such as museums, large libraries and depositories of archives, and refuges
intended to shelter, in the event of armed conflict, movable cultural property
. . . centers containing a large amount of cultural property.” 10
In contrast, the UNESCO Convention, which is generally more
concerned with the illicit trade of cultural property, defines cultural property
as: rare collections and specimens of fauna, flora, minerals and anatomy, and
objects of paleontological interest; property relating to history, including the
history of science and technology and military and social history; products
of archaeological excavations; elements of artistic or historical monuments
7.
8.
9.

10.

Sibel Özel, Under the Turkish Blanket Legislation: The Recovery of Cultural
Property Removed from Turkey, 38 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 177, 179 (2010).
Id.
See Stephanie O. Forbes, Securing the Future of Our Past: Current Efforts to
Protect Cultural Property, 9 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 235, 239 (1996) (“The numerous
and varied definitions given to cultural property contribute to the lack of uniformity
in cultural property protection laws.”).
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict
art. 1, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 215 [hereinafter 1954 Hague Convention]
(codifying international law agreement solely regarding cultural property).
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or archaeological sites which have been dismembered; antiquities more than
100 years old, such as inscriptions, coins and engraved seals; objects of
ethnological interest; property of artistic interest; rare manuscripts; old
books, documents and publications of special interest postage, revenue and
similar stamps; archives, including sound, photographic and
cinematographic archives; articles of furniture more than 100 years old; and
The UNIDROIT Convention somewhat
old musical instruments. 11
broadened the definition by defining cultural property as “includ[ing] those
objects which, on religious or secular grounds, are of importance for
archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or science and belong to one
of the categories listed in the Annex to the Convention.” 12 Specifically, the
UNDROIT Convention removed the word “property” from the definition
and replaced it with the word “objects.” Essentially, the UNIDORIT
definition expanded what types of objects can be protected, but only if they
first fall under a part of the UNESCO list. In light of the claims made by
Turkey, in that it is seeking many different types of cultural artifacts, this
paper will use the broader definition of cultural property adopted under the
UNIDROIT convention.

B.

Differing Perspectives on the Protection of Cultural Property

Whether one believes that Turkey is the rightful owner of all the cultural
property it claims depends much on whether one takes an internationalist or
nationalist perspective on who owns a particular antiquity. 13 Leading scholar
of art and law Professor John Henry Merryman illustrates the differences in
two prominent approaches on determining who owns cultural property in an
oft-cited law article. 14 Merryman explains, “one way of thinking about
cultural property is as components of a common human culture, whatever
their places of origin or present location, independent of property rights or
national jurisdiction.” 15 This view is known as “cultural internationalism,”
and identifies market forces as the best way to govern the movement of
cultural property because “everyone has an interest in the preservation and

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export
and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property art. 1, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S.
231 [hereinafter UNESCO Convention].
Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, art. 2,
June 24, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1322 [hereinafter UNIDROIT Convention]. See also
Forbes, supra note 9, at 240 (noting that “the drafters of the UNIDROIT
Convention recognized the dangers of an exhaustive definition that might exclude
objects worthy of protection . . . .”).
See generally Carol A. Roehrenbeck, Repatriation of Cultural Property—Who
Owns the Past? An Introduction to Approaches and to Selected Statutory
Instruments, 38 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 190 (2010) (discussing the philosophical
development and history of cultural internationalism and cultural nationalism).
See Merryman, supra note 5, at 831-32 (comparing and contrasting cultural
internationalism and cultural nationalism by analyzing the historical roots and
enactment of the Hague Convention in 1954 and UNESCO Convention in 1970).
Id. at 831.
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enjoyment of all cultural property, where it is located.” 16 Under this view,
cultural property belongs to the global community and the country that is
best situated to care for a specified piece of cultural property should take
possession of it. 17 The idea driving cultural internationalist is that everyone
has an interest in the preservation and enjoyment of cultural property,
regardless of its provenance, mired past, or to whom it originally belonged.
Merryman further describes a second way of thinking about cultural
property, which “is as part of a national cultural heritage.” This so-called
“cultural nationalism” gives nations “a special interest, implies the
attribution of national characters to object, independently of their location or
ownership, and legitimizes national export controls and demands for the
‘reparation’ of cultural property.” 18 It offers a contextual perspective to
cultural property, advocating that cultural property is best understood in its
original context. 19 Under this view, a “nation’s cultural property belongs
within the borders of the nation where it was created. In support [of this],
nationalists emphasize national interests, values, and pride.” 20
A cultural nationalist would likely view Turkey’s repatriation efforts in
a more sympathetic light, and quite possibly, as legitimate means to regain
control of its heritage; while a cultural internationalist would see Turkey’s
efforts as a country merely using its political clout, in a non-legitimate way,
to force museums’ hands. Outside of the international conventions, as will
be discussed below, Turkey’s legal right to repatriate its property depends
on which of the above views is adopted.

I.

INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY

The concern for protecting cultural property dates back centuries—the
first codified attempt to protect cultural property is largely considered the
Lieber code, which was concerned with the protection of cultural property
during times of war by regulating the conduct of invading countries. 21
According to the Red Cross, the Lieber Code or Instructions were “prepared
16.
17.

18.
19.
20.
21.

See Roehrenbeck, supra note 13, at 190 (discussing the philosophical development
and history of cultural internationalism and cultural nationalism).
See Merryman, supra note 5, at 836-7 (discussing Hague 1954 as “. . . a charter for
cultural internationalism.”); Roehrenbeck, supra note 13, at 190 (“Adherents of
Cultural Internationalism support the idea that everyone has an interest in the
preservation and enjoyment of all cultural property wherever it is located. Thus, the
cultural property belongs to the global community, and the country with the better
resources to care for another country’s cultural property should retain
possession.”).
See Merryman, supra note 5, at 832.
Id. at 843, 846 (defining cultural nationalism).
Id., at 834.
See David Keane, The Failure to Protect Cultural Property in Wartime, 14
DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 1, 3 (2004) (discussing the history of
legislative efforts to recognize and protect cultural property); Patty Gerstenblith,
Identity and Cultural Property: The Protection of Cultural Property in the United
States, 75 B.U. L. REV. 559, 572-73 (1995) (tracing the earliest protection of
cultural property in the U.S. to the 18th century).
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during the American Civil War by Francis Lieber” and later promulgated by
President Abraham Lincoln. 22 This code was binding only on the forces of
the United States but “corresponded to a great extent to the laws and customs
of war existing at that time.” 23 Generally, the Lieber Code mainly attempts
to codify the laws of war, but touches on the treatment of cultural property
during war. 24 As Professor Merryman points out, “the Lieber Code and its
progeny all dealt comprehensively with the obligations of belligerents.” 25
The focus of similar instruments then shifted from protecting cultural
property in times of war to the protection of cultural property in general. 26
As alluded to previously, there are three major international agreements
dealing with the protection of cultural property: (1) the Convention for the
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of May 14,
1954 27 (the “Hague Convention”) under the auspices of United Nations
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (“UNESCO”); (2) the
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import,
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property of November 14,
1970 28 (the “UNESCO Convention”); and (3) the UNIDROIT Convention
on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects 29 (“UNIDROIT
Convention). This paper will give context to Turkey’s repatriation claims
through a brief explanation of the three multilateral agreements. It will then
conclude that Turkey’s best claim to repatriating its cultural property is
through the UNESCO Convention. As will be discussed subsequently,
outside of the UNESCO Convention Turkey will have to seek other
legitimate avenues, much in the way same way Italy has, in successfully
negotiating the return of its cultural property.

A.

The Hague Convention

The Hague Convention, drafted in 1954, is an international treaty that
requires signatory countries to protect cultural property in times of war. 30
22.

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

29.

30.

Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (Apr. 24, 1863), available at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/110.
Id.
Id. at art. 34.
Merryman, supra note 5, at 834.
See id. at 835-36 (discussing progression during 19th Century from protection of
cultural property during war time to protection of cultural property in general).
1954 Hague Convention, supra note 10.
UNESCO Convention, supra note 11 (“Considering that it is incumbent on every
State to protect the cultural property existing within its territory against the dangers
of theft, clandestine excavation, and illicit export”).
See UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 12 (The Parties to the Convention
“[a]ssembled in Rome at the invitation of the Government of the Italian Republic
from 7 to 24 June 1995 for a Diplomatic Conference for the adoption of the draft
UNIDROIT Convention on the International Return of Stolen or Illegally Exported
Cultural Objects.”).
See 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 10, at art. 3; Forbes, supra note 9, at 244
(“As the first international convention to deal solely with the protection of cultural
property, the Hague Convention limits that protection to times of war.”).
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Over 100 countries have signed on to the treaty and many countries have
taken steps to support its status as customary law. 31 Despite signing the
treaty in 1954, the United States refused to ratify it until 2009, in part because
it would limit the capacity to use nuclear weapons. 32 Significantly, the
preamble to the Hague Convention defines cultural property as belonging to
the global community, which has an interest in preserving and enjoying all
cultural property, regardless of location. 33 The preamble is premised on the
idea of cultural internationalism 34 and the implications of this language are
of great importance and will be discussed later on.
Despite the strong language in the preamble, only Article 28 makes any
mention of sanctions that hold individuals or countries liable for violating
the Hague Convention. 35 Additionally, an important notion stemming from
this article is that individuals acting on orders from the government can also
be held responsible for committing crimes against cultural property. 36 This
dramatically shifted the way cultural property was protected. Prior to this,
only governments could be held responsible for committing these crimes;
those governments were then responsible for holding their citizens
accountable. 37
Unfortunately, the Hague Convention never gained much traction in the
international community. This may be due to the lack of an effective
enforcement provision. 38 Lacking such a provision allowed countries to sign
the Hague Convention without “fear of the burdens that might arise in the
event of actual enforcement.” 39 Also, the Convention only emphasized
31.

32.
33.

34.
35.

36.

37.
38.
39.

See David A. Meyer, The 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention and Its
Emergence into Customary International Law, 11 B.U. INT’L L.J. 349, 353 (1993)
(discussing the development of cultural property law through conventions prior to
the 1954 Hague Convention).
Id. at 353.
1954 Hague Convention, supra note 10, at introduction (“Being convinced that
damage to cultural property belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to
the cultural heritage of all mankind . . . .”). See also Merryman, supra note 5, at
836 (noting that the 1954 Hague Convention recognized the preservation of the
cultural heritage as of great importance for all peoples of the world and that it is
important that this heritage receive international protection).
HOWARD M. HENSEL, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 60 (2007).
See 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 10, at art. 28 (requesting each party to
“take, within the framework of their ordinary criminal jurisdiction, all necessary
steps to prosecute and impose penal or disciplinary sanctions upon those persons,
of whatever nationality, who commit or order to be committed a breach of the
present Convention.”).
Merryman, supra note 5, at 836 (stating “[t]he innovation here . . . was that other
nations imposed responsibility on an individual official of the offending belligerent
power for acts against cultural property committed in its name.”).
Id. (outlining the previous agreements’ stipulations of individual liability).
Zoë Howe, Can the 1954 Hague Convention Apply to Non-Sate Actors?: A Study
of Iraq and Libya, 47 TEX. INT’L L.J. 403, 413 (2012).
Meyer, supra note 31, at 357 (stating “[b]ecause the Convention does not have
effective sanction enforcement provisions, states are able to announce their
accession to Convention principles without much fear of the burdens that might
arise in the event of actual enforcement”).
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protection of cultural property during times of war, which limited its
applicability. 40 Nonetheless, the Hague Convention helped solidify the
protection of cultural property during times of war.

B.

The UNESCO Convention

The UNESCO Convention was the next significant step in the protection
of cultural property, markedly changing the mechanism by which protect
cultural property is protected. 41 Unlike the Hague Convention, the UNESCO
Convention “focuses on private conduct during peacetime and thus
complements the Hague Convention by protecting cultural property beyond
periods of war.” 42 The main intention of the UNESCO Convention is to
inhibit, or at the very least reduce, the “illicit” trade of cultural objects in the
international market. 43 As Professor Merryman points out, “[t]he parties
agree to oppose the ‘impoverishment of the cultural heritage’ of a nation
through ‘illicit import, export and transfer of ownership’ of cultural property
(Article 2), agree that trade in cultural objects exported contrary to the law
of the nation of origin is “illicit” (Article 3), and agree to prevent the
importation of such objects and facilitate their return to source nations
(Articles 7, 9 and 13).” 44 Professor Patty Gerstenblith—a law school
Professor and Director of the Center for Art, Museum, and Cultural Heritage
Law at DePaul University College of Law—points out that there are two key
provisions, at least from the perspective of market nations: Article 7(b) and
Article 9. 45 Both of these provisions deal with imposing import restrictions
on cultural property. Article 7 deals more specifically with what is
considered stolen cultural property; Article 9 deals with the ability of source
nations to call on market nations to deal with particular problems facing
these source nations in preventing the removal of cultural property from their
territory. 46
Notably, signatory countries have interpreted the UNESCO Convention
as justifying the retention of cultural property within their respective

40.
41.

42.
43.

44.
45.
46.

Forbes, supra note 9, at 244 (stating that the Hague Convention’s protection is
limited to times of war).
See Merryman, supra note 5, at 844-45 (discussing how the UNESCO
Convention’s incorporation of the term “illicit” and its effect on cultural property
protection was novel, taking “10 years to enact.”).
Forbes, supra note 9, at 244.
See Merryman, supra note 5, at 843 (stating “[t]he basic purpose of UNESCO 1970,
as its title indicates, is to inhibit the “illicit” international trade in cultural objects.”);
UNESCO Convention, supra note 11, at art. 2 (recognizing that “illicit” import is
the main cause of “impoverishment of cultural heritage”).
Merryman, supra note 5, at 843 (quoting and summarizing the UNESCO
Convention).
Gerstenblith, supra note 21, at 619.
Merryman, supra note 5, at 832 (stating “[i]n source nations, the supply of desirable
cultural property exceeds the internal demand . . . In market nations, the demand
exceeds the supply . . . .”); UNESCO Convention, supra note 11, at art. 9 (listing
the duties of source and market nations when cultural property is in danger).
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territories. Professor Merryman argues that this “intention is made clear in
Article 2 of the Convention, which states: ‘[t]he States Parties to this
Convention recognize that . . . the illicit import, export and transfer of
ownership of cultural property is one of the main causes of the
impoverishment of the cultural heritage of the countries of origin of such
property. . . .’” 48 This view is premised on the cultural nationalist
perspective. 49 Consequently, countries view the UNESCO Convention as
legitimizing export control laws and the ability of many countries,
particularly countries of origin to seek repatriation. 50 Thus, the main
function of the UNESCO Convention is to curb the circulation of cultural
property through the provisions of the UNESCO Convention and the laws of
signatory countries.

C.

The UNIDROIT Convention

The UNIDROIT Convention is the most recent international agreement
targeting cultural property protection. While it has not been ratified by
neither Turkey or the United States, the UNODROIT Convention has been
adopted by 33 other countries. 51 It seeks to accomplish two objectives: (1)
to deal with technical problems resulting from different national laws; and
(2) to further strengthen the fight against the illicit trafficking of cultural
property. 52
The UNIDROT Convention differs from the UNESCO Convention in
some important respects. For one, while the UNESCO Convention’s
protection is limited to cultural property stolen “from a museum or a
religious or secular public monument or similar institution in another State
Party to this Convention, and as documented under ownership of that
institution,” 53 the UNIDROIT Convention expands this protection to private
individuals. 54 Therefore, any private cultural property stolen from a private

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

52.

53.

54.

Merryman, supra note 5, at 844 (stating “[a]n alternative reading . . . is that these
words justify national retention of cultural property.”).
Id.
HENSEL, supra note 34, at 60.
Merryman, supra note 5, at 845 (defining “repatriation . . . [as] the return of cultural
objects to nations of origin”).
UNIDROIT
Convention
List
of
Parties,
available
at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/implement/i-95.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2013)
((listing the Convention’s ratifying parties).
Forbes, supra note 9, at 246; MARINA SCHNEIDER, UNIDROIT CONVENTION ON
STOLEN OR ILLEGALLY EXPORTED CULTURAL OBJECTS: EXPLANATORY REPORT 478
(2001).
Forbes supra note 9, at 246 (discussing the draw backs of the UNESCO
Convention). See also UNESCO Convention, supra note 11, at art. 7(b)(i) (stating
“[parties to this Convention undertake] at the request of the State Party of origin,
to take appropriate steps to recover and return any such cultural property imported
. . . provided . . . that the requesting State shall pay just compensation to an innocent
purchaser or to a person who has valid title to that property.”).
Forbes, supra note 9, at 246-47 (stating “[t]he UNIDROIT Convention does not
require such a designation by the state”).
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home and not documented with the state or an institution is covered under
the Convention. 55
Another difference is that the UNIDROIT Convention seeks to fix the
discrepancy created by Article 7(b)(ii) of the UNESCO Convention between
common law and civil law countries. 56 Common law countries, like the
United States, value the interests of the original owner over the subsequent
bona fide purchaser, requiring the return of cultural property without
reimbursement. 57 In contrast, civil law countries—predominantly European
nations—allow subsequent bona fide purchasers to acquire title over the
original owners, “forever depriving the original owner of title.” 58 The
UNIDROIT Convention reconciled these divergent views by solidifying the
protection of the aggrieved, original owner over the bona fide purchaser, 59
which deviates significantly from civil law. To conciliate civil law countries,
Article 4 of this convention provides “payment of fair and reasonable
compensation” to good faith purchasers who can prove that they were
unaware the object was stolen and “exercised due diligence” by attempting
to determine the object’s origin when purchasing it. 60
Finally, another significant aspect of the UNIDROIT Convention is the
distinction it makes between cultural property that is stolen and cultural
property that is illegally exported. 61 Article 3 unambiguously states that the
possessor of a cultural object which has been stolen shall return it.” 62
[Emphasis added]. On the other hand, Article 5 states that a “[c]ontracting
State may request the court or other competent authority of another
Contracting State to order the return of a cultural object illegally
exported from the territory of a requesting State.” 63 [Emphasis added]. This
distinction is significant because “it reflects an awareness and
acknowledgment by the UNIDROIT Convention . . . of international

55.

56.
57.
58.

59.

60.

61.
62.
63.

Id. at 247 (stating “[t]herefore, cultural objects stolen from private homes or any
kind of private collections that are neither registered with, nor designated by, the
state, and do not originate from traditional communities, can be claimed by the
original owners.”); UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 12, at art. 2 (describing
what is considered to be a “cultural object.”).
Id. (discussing the crucial role of UNIDROIT to reconcile common law and civil
law ownership).
Id.
Id. (stating “[h]owever, the civil law, which is followed by European nations,
favors the rights of a subsequent bona fide purchaser who is awarded with title,
forever depriving the original owner of title.”).
Id. at 247-48 (stating “the UNIDROIT Convention establishes a preference for
providing protection to the dispossessed owner as opposed to the current
possessor”).
UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 12, at art. 4 (stating “[t]he possessor of a stolen
cultural object required to return it shall be entitled, at the time of its restitution, to
payment of fair and reasonable compensation provided that the possessor neither
knew nor ought reasonably to have known that the object was stolen and can prove
that it exercised due diligence when acquiring the object.”).
Id. at art. 3, 5; Forbes, supra note 9, at 250-51.
UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 12, at art. 3.
Id. at art. 5.
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solidarity and the cultural internationalist view . . . possibly showing the
beginnings of an evolution in legal thinking away from the cultural
nationalist view.” 64

II. PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES
The United States is a market nation—a high consumer of cultural
property—and has recognized the importance of cultural property by
pledging, alongside other countries, to take steps to adequately protect
cultural property. 65 At the international level, this commitment to the
protecting of cultural property is best evidenced by the United States’s
adoption and ratification of the UNESCO Convention. 66 Domestically, the
United States “has taken a number of measures to support the retentive
policies of source nations.” 67 Notably, the country has developed a
substantive body of law applicable to the return of cultural, including
common law principles, 68 the National Stolen Property Act (“NSPA”), 69 and
the Cultural Property Implementation Act (“CPIA”). 70

A.

Cultural Property Implementation Act

In 1972, while considering whether to ratify the UNESCO Convention,
the United States decided to give its consent, but only if the Convention was
executory in nature. 71 This meant that in order for the Convention to take
domestic legal effect, Congress would have to enact implementing
legislation. 72 Subsequently, the CPIA passed giving the UNESCO
Convention legal effect in the United States. 73 Essentially, the CPIA
provides a mechanism for the United States government to establish import
64.
65.

66.
67.

68.

69.
70.
71.
72.

73.

Forbes, supra note 9, at 251.
Katherine D. Vitale, The War on Antiquities: United States Law and Foreign
Cultural Property, 84 NOTRE DAME L. Rev. 1835, 1838 (2009) (“The United
States recognizes the importance of cultural property and has pledged to protect
it by cooperating with other states.”).
Id. at 1843.
JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE RETENTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY, IN THINKING
ABOUT THE ELGIN MARBLES: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON CULTURAL PROPERTY, ART AND
LAW 122, 125 (2000).
U.S. law operates under the common law system, where a good faith purchaser
cannot acquire good title from a thief. See U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (2012) (“A purchaser
of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had power to transfer except
that a purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights only to the extent of the
interest purchased.”). Thus, in cases where an antiquity is stolen, or considered
stolen because of its illegal export, the foreign source nation may successfully
reclaim it upon a showing of ownership.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2012).
Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2613
(2012).
Gerstenblith, supra note 21, at 623.
Id. (“Although the Senate unanimously gave its advice and consent to ratification
in 1972, the Convention is not self-executing and it has not been ratified for lack
of the domestic legal means necessary to carry out its obligations.”).
Id.
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restrictions on cultural property at the request of another party to the
UNESCO Convention once other requirements are fulfilled. 74
Interestingly, the CPIA implemented only two sections of the UNESCO
Convention. 75 Thus, there are two main provisions of the CPIA: the first
provision addresses cultural property stolen from public institutions pursuant
to Article 7(b) of the UNESCO Convention; 76 and the second targets the
“types of archeological and ethnological materials to which the Article 9
provisions [of the UNESCO Convention] may apply.” 77 Ultimately, the
CPIA’s specific provision implementing Article 7 of the UNESCO
Convention prohibits the importation of any article of cultural property that
has been stolen from the inventory of a museum or religious or secular public
monument or similar institution from any other party to the UNESCO
Lastly, the implementing provisions governing the
Convention. 78
applicability of Article 9 of the UNESCO Convention allows, inter alia, the
United States to enter into bilateral agreements with other countries to
impose import restrictions on cultural items coming into the United States. 79

B.

National Stolen Property Act

The NSPA, which was enacted in 1948, states that “[w]hoever
transports, transmits, or transfers in interstate or foreign commerce any
goods ... of the value of $5,000 or more, knowing the same to have been
stolen, converted or taken by fraud ... [s]hall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.” 80 Congress passed the NSPA
as an extension of the National Stolen Motor Vehicle Act of 1919; initially,
the NSPA was passed with the intention that it apply only to individuals who
steal property in one state and bring it to another state. 81 There is no specific
indication that Congress contemplated that the NSPA’s scope extend to
74.
75.
76.

77.

78.
79.
80.

81.

19 U.S.C. § 2602(a)(1)(A)-(D) (2012). See also United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d
393, 408(2d Cir. 2003) (discussing the applicability of the CPIA.).
Gerstenblith, supra note 21, at 623 (discussing how the CPIA only explicitly
implemented Article 7(b) and Article 9 of the UNESCO convention).
Id. at 625. See also 19 U.S.C. § 2607 (2012) (“No article of cultural property
documented as appertaining to the inventory of a museum or religious or
secular public monument or similar institution in any State Party which is
stolen from such institution after the effective date of this chapter, or after the
date of entry into force of the Convention for the State Party, whichever date
is later, may be imported into the United States.”).
Gerstenblith, supra note 21, at 629 (listing the language of the pertinent CPIA
sections governing the applicability of Article 9). See also 19 U.S.C. § 2601(2)
(2012) (defining ‘ethnological or archaeological material’”).
19 U.S.C. § 2607 (2012).
19 U.S.C. § 2602 (2012).
18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2012); Sue J. Park, Comment, The Cultural Property Regime in
Italy: An Industrialized Source Nation’s Difficulties in Retaining and Recovering
its Antiquities, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 931, 942 (2002).
Vitale, supra note 65, at 115 (“Congress passed NSPA in 1934 as an extension of
the National Stolen Motor Vehicle Act of 1919, 98 and intended it to reach
individuals who stole property in one state in the United States and brought it into
another.”).
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archaeological material or antiquities from a foreign state. However, in
United States v. McClain, 82 the Fifth Circuit adopted a broad definition of
property and what constituted theft under the NSPA by using foreign state
ownership laws to determine whether the cultural property at issue had been
stolen. 83 Today, NSPA applies to cultural property that is taken from a
foreign state whose government “asserts actual ownership of the property
pursuant to a valid patrimony law.” 84
In considering actions under the NSPA, United States courts consider
whether a source country’s national patrimony law “sufficiently vests
ownership in the artifact, such that it could be considered ‘stolen,’ and
therefore form the basis of a cognizable claim within the courts’
jurisdiction.” 85 The NSPA also has a scienter requirement limiting liability
to defendants who sell or receive property that they know has been illegally
excavated in violation of a foreign country’s export laws. 86 Consequently,
proving that the defendant had knowledge of the source country’s national
patrimony law is a requirement for successful prosecution under the
NSPA. Notably, “because of often ambiguous circumstances surrounding
the excavation and provenance of a cultural object, this evidentiary burden
of the NSPA often functions as a barrier to source countries seeking the
return of their property.” 87

III. TURKEY’S REPATRIATION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY
As noted above, Turkey is a country of rich cultural heritage. 88 Over the
years, Turkey has developed a reputation as a country that embodies a
nationalist perspective when it comes to cultural property. 89 Consequently,
over the last couple of decades, and with increasing aggressiveness, Turkey
has sought the return of what it has identified as its “cultural property” by
82.

83.
84.
85.

86.

87.
88.
89.

United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 1000-01 (5th Cir. 1977) (stating that “a
declaration of national ownership is necessary before illegal exportation of an
article can be considered theft, and the exported article considered “stolen,” within
the meaning of the National Stolen Property Act.”).
Id. at 994-97 (analyzing Mexican law to conclude that states must declare
ownership of an article before it can be considered stolen).
United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 416 (2d Cir. 2003).
Jessica E. Morrow, The National Stolen Property Act and the Return of Stolen
Cultural Property to its Rightful Foreign Owners, 30 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
249, 255 (2007).
John A. Cohan, An Examination of Archaeological Ethics and the Repatriation
Movement Respecting Cultural Property (Part Two), 28 U.C. DAVIS ENVIRONS
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 1, 65 (2004) (noting that the NSPA requires “knowing”
selling or receiving of illegally excavated articles in order to face prosecution).
Morrow, supra note 85, at 255.
Bilefsky, supra note 4, at A1 (discussing the region’s rich cultural history).
See Jason Farago, Turkey’s Restitution Dispute with the Met Challenges the
NEWS
(Oct.
7,
2012),
‘Universal
Museum,’
GUARDIAN
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/oct/07/turkey-restitutiondispute-met (discussing how nationalism is driving Turkey’s aggressive campaign
to get all of its cultural property returned).
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arguing that these cultural artifacts belong to them because cultural objects
are best understood in their country of origin and thus should be returned. 90
Operating within this paradigm, and admittedly in circumstances where
Turkey’s claims are, at times, legitimate, Turkey has successfully negotiated
the repatriation of cultural property; examples of this include the return of
the Lydian Hoard, 91 the Weary Hercules, 92 and a 3,000 year-old Sphinx. 93
In a clear-cut case for Turkey, the Metropolitan Museum of Art (the
“Met”), in 1993, returned the Lydian Hoard collection, which was allegedly
excavated from tombs near Sardis, near Hermus river valley in Turkey, after
the Turkish government brought suit against the Met, alleging that the pieces
were illegally excavated and wound up in the United States in violation of
Turkey’s export laws. 94 Turkey achieved the return of the Lydian Hoard
collection after presenting the Met with convincing evidence that the
collection had been stolen from Turkey. 95 This case is much easier to justify
on Turkey’s behalf due to the undisputed documentation provided by
Turkey.
Another case where Turkey claimed legitimate ownership over a cultural
property was the case of the top half of the Weary Hercules, which was
returned to Turkey in 2011 after two decades of intense negotiation. 96 Turkey
alleged that the top half of the statue was removed from an archaeological
dig and was smuggled out of the country forty years previously. 97 One piece
of pivotal proof the Turkish government offered was proving that the bottom
half of the piece, which they possessed since the entire statute had been
unearthed in southern Turkey in 1980, before the top half was stolen by
looters, matched the top half held at the Boston Museum of Fine Arts. 98
90.
91.

92.

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

98.

See id. (noting the recent trend of states to demand repatriation based on
nationalistic beliefs of ownership).
See Carol Vogel, Metropolitan Museum to Return Turkish Art, N.Y. TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/09/23/arts/metropolitan-museum-to-return-turkishart.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2013) (“The collection, known as the Lydian Hoard,
consists of pitchers, bowls, ladles and incense-burners as well as jewelry of gold,
silver, carnelian and glass from the reign of King Croesus of Lydia, a kingdom in
western Asia Minor that flourished in the seventh and sixth centuries B.C.”).
Selcan Hacaoglu, Boston Museum Returns Top Half of Hercules Statue to Turkey,
THE DAILY STAR LEBANON, Sept. 27, 2011, at 16 (The Weary Hercules is a 1,900
year old statue of a tired Hercules leaning on his club. The statue was split into
halves and the top half was stolen from Perge, Turkey).
Bilefsky, supra note 4, at A1 (discussing Turkey’s effort in getting the return of a
3,000 year old sphinx from Germany).
Vogel, supra note 91 (explaining the provenance of the artifacts and how Turkey
determined the illegality of their transfer).
Id. (noting evidence obtained from thieves, authorities, and museum officials that
the artifacts were illegally obtained).
Hacaoglu, supra note 92, at 16 (noting that the piece had finally been delivered).
Owen Matthews, Reclaiming Hercules, NEWSWEEK INT’L (April 18, 2012)
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-285874088.html (noting that the Boston
Museum of Fine Arts voluntarily returned the artifact).
Greek God Hercules Reunited With His Bottom Half as Museum Agrees to Send
Back ‘Looted’ Bust to Turkey, THE DAILY MAIL (July 22, 2011, 11:09 AM),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2017629/Weary-Herakles-reunited-half-
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Again, this case presents another example of a legitimate repatriation claim
Turkey made that included undisputed evidence.
A more problematic case is that of the 3,000 year-old Sphinx that was
returned to Turkey in 2011. 99 The 3,000 year-old Sphinx was from Hattusa,
the capital of the Hittite Empire in what today is modern-day Turkey. 100 The
Sphinx had been on display in a German museum since 1934, and prior to
Germany agreeing to give the 3,000 year-old Sphinx to Turkey, legal
ownership of the Sphinx had been in dispute for decades because neither
country could produce documents that established legitimate ownership. 101
It was only after Turkey threatened to prohibit German archaeologists from
excavating in Turkey that the German museum capitulated and agreed to
deliver the Sphinx to Turkey. 102 Admittedly, while this case is a little less
problematic than other cases considering that the cultural property can be
traced back to a region within Turkey’s border, the main problem remains to
be that Turkey failed to prove when this cultural property left Turkey.
The more recent case of the 3,000-year-old Sphinx highlights the recent
trend of Turkey ramping up its efforts in seeking the return of cultural
property that it believes belongs to the country and part of the region’s rich
cultural history. 103 Turkey’s latest fiasco with the Met, 104 in which Turkey
asked the Met to return cultural artifacts that are part of the Norbert
Schimmel collection (“Schimmel collection”) 105 donated to the Met by
Norbert Schimmel, illustrate this point. 106 In the summer of 2012, Turkey
filed a criminal complaint in a Turkish criminal court to further investigate
the suspected pieces in the Schimmel collection. 107
In 2012, flexing its political muscle, and much like the case of the 3,000year-old Sphinx, Turkey gave museums, like the Met, an ultimatum: either
return the cultural property being requested, or else be banned from

99.

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

106.

107.

looted-bust-returns-Turkey.html (discussing that the halves were matched when
plaster casts of each half of the statute were matched together).
See Eric Kelsey, Germany’s Pergamon Museum Returns Ancient Sphinx of Hattusa
to its Home in Turkey,
ARTDAILY.ORG (August 1, 2011),
http://artdaily.com/index.asp?int_sec=2&int_new=49494#.UwIxnnddXuc
(last
visited Feb. 17, 2014).
Id.
Id.
Id. See also, Bilefsky, supra note 4, at A1.
Bilefsky, supra note 4, at A1.
Id. (discussing Turkey’s accusations of the Met’s improper retention of the artifacts
and conditioning upon their return future loans of artworks).
Exclusive: Turkey Seeks the Return of 18 Objects from the Metropolitan Museum
of
Art,
CHASING
APHRODITE
(Mar.
20,
2012),
http://chasingaphrodite.com/2012/03/20/exclusive-turkey-seeks-the-return-of-18objects-from-the-metropolitan-museum-of-art/.
See Grace Glueck, Norbert Schimmel, Collector, Dies; Specialist in Antiquities was
85, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1990, at B11 (discussing some of the major pieces in the
Schimmel collection).
Bilefsky, supra note 4, at A1.
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exporting important cultural artworks from Turkey for future exhibitions. 108
This, of course, would have the effect of prohibiting museums from
researching, discovering, or displaying important cultural property from
Turkey. Indeed, Turkey has remained faithful to this rhetoric by cancelling
export licenses for artifacts heading to major museums. 109 These actions put
widely adopted museum practices, based largely on the UNESCO
Convention, of freely retaining, displaying, and exchanging cultural
property, where any available evidence fails to demonstrate the property left
the country of origin post-1970, at risk. 110 Crafting a workaround, Turkey
defends its actions by citing a 1906 Ottoman Empire law claiming that
anything removed after 1906 should be returned to Turkey. 111
The aggressive pursuit of cultural property by source countries is
certainly not unprecedented; other countries—Italy, Egypt and Greece—
have also engaged in aggressive repatriation of their respective cultural
property. 112 However, Turkey’s approach remains markedly different from
that of other source countries. In addition to making demands for its cultural
property without providing any evidence that the cultural property it is
seeking was stolen, Turkey is refusing to lend its cultural property to
museums while publicly shaming museums that refuse to yield to its
demands. 113 While Turkey has every right to request the return of its cultural
property within the scope of the aforementioned international conventions,
its consistent unsubstantiated demands—taking, for example, the Schimmel
collection, where Turkey has failed to provide any evidence that these
108. See Id. (predicating loans of artwork on returning the questioned artifacts or
proving that the artifacts were indeed legally obtained).
109. See Farago, supra note 89 (“This year’s Met mega-exhibition of Byzantine art had
to make do without Turkish loans (though the Met’s curators coyly say they never
wanted any). So did the British Museum’s spring show about the Hajj: while
Turkish museums agreed to lend 35 objects to the BM, the culture ministry shut the
lending down. Ankara is also playing hardball with the Louvre, the V&A, the
Pergamon and pretty much every other encyclopedic museum in the west.”).
110. Bilefsky, supra note 4, at A1 (noting that under the UNESCO Convention, transfers
of cultural property prohibited by the convention would begin three months after
the signing of the convention’s signing).
111. Id. (describing Ottoman law, which prohibits all exportation of cultural artifacts).
112. See, e.g., United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 395, 398 (2d Cir. 2003) (seeking return
of its cultural property, Egypt declared ownership of all archaeological artifacts
found in Egypt after 1983 pursuant to its Antiquities’ Protection Law (Article 6));
Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg and Feldman Fine
Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990) (ruling that the Church of Cyprus should
recover mosaics taken from one of its churches); Lauren F. Silver, Recapturing Art:
A Comprehensive Assessment of the Italian Model for Cultural Property
Protection, 23 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 1 (2010) (describing the methods Italy has used
to repatriate its cultural property).
113. See Tom Mashberg, No Quick Answers in Fights Over Art, N.Y. TIMES, July 2,
2013,
at
C1,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/02/arts/design/museums-property-claims-arenot-simply-about-evidence.html?pagewanted=1&_r=0 (discussing how Turkey
questioned the Getty’s ownership “of several dozen items without providing any
evidence.”).
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cultural properties were taken out of the country after 1970—threaten to
subvert the current art repatriation regime created by these conventions.

IV. THE IRONIES IN TURKEY’S CLAIMS
A.

There is Loot in Turkey’s Museums

Interestingly, Turkey itself has been openly criticized for its own alleged
looting of property that is not necessarily of Turkish origin. 114 It is important
to note that there is an aura of hypocrisy to Turkey’s claims, as it is suspected
that many significant works in Turkish museums were taken from, and
arguably belong in, foreign countries. In particular, a “good [fraction] of
[these works] . . . come from Lebanon, Greece, the former Yugoslavia and
other regions once controlled by the Ottoman Empire.” 115
Probably the most famous cultural artwork in a Turkish museum that is
burdened by ownership contention is Alexander’s sarcophagus, which
arguably should be returned to Lebanon. 116 The sarcophagus was discovered
in 1887 by a team led by Osman Hamdi Bey in the city of Sidon, Lebanon 117
and is currently displayed in Istanbul’s Archeological Museum. 118 Turkey
claims that the sarcophagus, along with many other ancient artifacts looted
by the Ottoman Empire, belongs to Turkey and should stay in Turkish
museums. 119 According to Murat Suslu, Turkey’s director-general for
cultural heritage and museums, “the sarcophagus [is] legally Turkey’s
because it had been excavated on territory that belonged to Turkey at the
time.” 120 These kinds of difficulties—whether cultural property belongs to
the country where it was uncovered or whether it belongs to the country
where citizens identify the most culturally as part of their heritage— raise
another issue in Turkey’s blanket claims to cultural property and is exactly
the problem that is presented when trying to decide who is the proper owner
of an antiquity.

114. Edmond Y. Azadian, Looters or Landlords?, ARMENIAN MIRROR-SPECTATOR (Oct.
3,
2012),
http://www.mirrorspectator.com/2012/10/03/looters-or-landlords/
(referring to items such as a sarcophagus associated with Alexander the Great,
which was taken from Lebanon when Turkey controlled that land).
115. See Farago, supra note 89 (juxtaposing the foreign provenance of the Met’s
collection with that of Turkey’s museums).
116. See generally Judith H. Dobrzynski, Who’s in the Alexander Sarcophagus?, WALL
ST. J., Jun. 27, 2009, at W14 (discussing the discovery of what may be Alexander
the Great’s sarcophagus).
117. Id. (providing examples of his work as director of Istambul’s Archaeological
Museum).
118. Id. (stating that the sarcophagus occupies a position of honor in the museum’s
collection).
119. Id.
120. Bilefsky, supra note 4, at A1 (noting that Turkish authorities claim that, as Sidon
was part of Turkey’s territory, objects found there legally belong to Turkey).
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B.

Is Turkey Still Looting?

Aside from the items in contention already in Turkish museums, Turkey
faces even stronger accusations that it continues to loot items from other
countries, even today. For instance, the U.S. government has accused
Turkish nationals in the Turkish-occupied part of Northern Cyprus of
illegally excavating and auctioning off a substantial amount of the Cyprus
cultural heritage. 121 To rebut these claims, Turkish officials have said that
these excavations are legal because the northern part of Cyprus, which is
recognized by Turkey as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
(“TRNC”), is an independent state acting pursuant to its sovereignty. 122
However, no country except for Turkey recognizes the TRNC. 123 Indeed,
“archaeological excavations in the occupied northern part of Cyprus are
prohibited unless they are critical to the preservation of cultural property; in
such a case, excavations must be carried out with the cooperation of the
national competent authorities of the occupied territory.” 124 Since the TRNC
has not requested the cooperation and involvement of the government of
Cyprus, the excavations of cultural property in Northern Cyprus and
subsequent auctioning off or shipment to Turkey by the Turkish officials are
likely contrary to international law. 125

V. ANALYSIS
A.

The Problems with Turkey’s Demands

In brief, Turkey claims a right in all cultural property that it believes was
excavated from Turkish soil irrespective of when it left the country. Notably,
Turkey has ratified the UNESCO convention, which sets up a framework
allowing Turkey to seek repatriation of any cultural property that left the
country after 1970. 126 Turkey, however, has chosen to ignore this
requirement and continue with its cultural nationalist rhetoric by citing to the

121. See Theresa Papademetriou, Cyprus: Destruction of Cultural Property in the
Northern Part of Cyprus and Violations of International Law, LAW LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS,
10
(April
2009),
available
at
http://www.loc.gov/law/help/cyprus_final_rpt.pdf (providing a framework for
viewing the issue in terms of violation of international law).
122. Id. at 3 (claiming that the authorized powers are managing disputed sites and
objects with the aims of preservation and protection).
123. Id. at 1 (emphasizing that Turkey is the only exception to a worldwide lack of
diplomatic recognition for the TRNC).
124. Id. (laying out the default rule against with the conduct of TRNC and Turkey will
be judged).
125. Id. at 32 (partly basing the illegality of such actions on the TRNC’s lack of
international recognition and Turkey’s failure to ratify the 1999 Protocol to the
1954 Hague Convention which provides the exception upon which Turkey claims
to rely).
126. UNESCO
Convention
List
of
Parties,
available
at
http://www.unesco.org/culture/ich/?pg=00024(last visited Nov. 1, 2013) (listing
the countries that have currently ratified or signed the Convention).
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1906 Ottoman Empire law. 127 The continued use of this law is problematic
because it does not distinguish between cultural property taken out of the
country prior to 1970 and those taken out subsequent to the UNESCO
convention ratification. As such, Turkey’s continued enforcement of this
law despite the UNESCO causes practical problems as it puts museums in
an awkward legal position.
An illustration of Turkey’s current faulty strategy on art repatriation will
be explored by examining Turkey’s request for repatriation of objects from
the Schimmel collection at the Met and determining whether, under current
law, it should be honored. In particular, the items in the Schimmel collection
were likely removed from Turkey prior to 1970; however, these items were
first recorded in the United States in 1974. 128 This is an example of a
situation where Turkey has claimed that property was wrongfully acquired
and must be returned. Although, since many of the items likely left before
1970, the UNESCO criteria are fulfilled (unless there is another reason to
regard it as stolen) and the museum had every right to acquire and keep it. 129
Additionally, even when museums satisfy UNESCO requirements, Turkey
still attempts to coerce them into returning pieces it deems illegally exported
under the 1906 law. Turkey’s strategy in these cases is to place pressure on
museums such as the Met and other similarly situated museums by “refusing
to lend objects for exhibitions unless antiquities with a[n] [sic] unknown
provenance are returned to the country, delaying all licenses for
archeological excavations, and publicly denouncing museums as enablers of
illicit looting.” 130 Turkey’s demands extend to major museums all over the
world, including the British Museum, 131 the Cleveland Museum of Art, 132
the J. Paul Getty Museum, 133 and others. 134
Turkey’s request for repatriation of the Schimmel collection is premised
on cultural nationalism as demonstrated through the rhetoric they engage in
when making the demands form these museums and through Turkey’s
demands for all cultural property that may have left Turkey, regardless of
when that property left the area. 135 As such, Turkey’s reclamation efforts
focus on the return of works. It may be said that such restoration enables
Turkish citizens to reconnect with their ancestral past. The argument asserts
127. See supra text accompanying notes 7-8.
128. Lee Rosenbaum, Turkey’s Repatriation Claims: Met’s Schimmel Benefactions
Targeted,
CULTUREGRRL
(Mar.
20,
2012),
http://www.artsjournal.com/culturegrrl/2012/03/turkeys_repatriation_claims_me.
html (stating that “most of the objects being sought by Turkey have no documented
ownership history other than being in the Schimmel Collection by the mid 1960s
or 1970s.”).
129. Id.
130. Mary Elizabeth Williams, Turkey Battles Museums for Return of Antiquities
following Arab Spring, CENTER FOR ART LAW (Dec. 10, 2012),
http://www.itsartlaw.com/2012/12/turkey-battles-museums-for-return-of.html.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See Farago, supra note 89 (discussing how the issues of nationalism and power are
driving Turkey’s aggressive campaign to get all of its cultural property returned).
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that the cultural property is part of Turkish culture and is best understood in
its original context. Extending this logic a little further means that any
cultural property found on Turkish soil, irrespective of its true origin—
whether it come from Assyrian, Armenian, Greek or other nationalities—is
best understood on Turkish land.
However, when a particular piece is removed from Turkish soil, it is
difficult for Turkey to allege a strong emotional attachment to a work it never
knew existed. Furthermore, such arguments will not withstand close
scrutiny in light of the fact that the Ottoman Empire included so many
different peoples and cultures, and therefore many of the artifacts in question
may be identified with other cultures that are not particularly connected with
modern-day Turkey. Thus, any moral claim that Turkey might use
concerning the Met’s Schimmel collection or any similar collection or
artifact is tenuous at best, and unlikely to be sufficiently persuasive as to
obligate museums and art galleries to return such pieces to Turkey.
What is even more troubling about Turkey’s recent demands against the
Met is that they are not accompanied with any evidence that these items did
in fact come from Turkey. 136 Making blanket moral statements that the
cultural property, like the Schimmel collection, should be returned to Turkey
because its of Turkish origin is unlikely to provide incentives to museums to
cooperate and will not meet the legal requirements for a case in federal
court. 137 This could in turn hinder other repatriation efforts by making
museums less willing to cooperate with source countries generally should
Turkey’s current strategy become a trend amongst other nations. Since
Turkey’s claims of ownership of the Schimmel collection are based on
nationalism, unpersuasive emotional attachment, and no evidence, the Met
is under no obligation to return the collection without any reason (i.e.
evidence) demonstrating the collection was stolen; it has fulfilled its
obligations under the UNESCO and UNDROIT conventions.

B.

A “More Nuanced” Approach: A Focus on Mutually
Beneficial Bilateral Agreements

As demonstrated through the example of the Schimmel collection, a
more nuanced approach is needed for Turkey’s future repatriation efforts to
be successful. This is supported by the trend in legal scholarship that argues
for nuanced policies for the positions in antiquities debates. 138 To find a new
approach, Turkey should look to models of current successful art repatriation
strategies, such as the one utilized by Italy in the formation of a new Turkish
repatriation policy.

136. See Bilefsky, supra note 4, at A1 (stating that Turkish officials had not “yet
uncovered that the objects had been illegally smuggled out.”).
137. Id.
138. Alexander A. Bauer, New Ways of Thinking about Cultural Property: A Critical
Appraisal of the Antiquities Trade Debates, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 690, 695
(2007) (arguing that nuanced policies may “represent a pragmatic way forward.”).
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Italy is a worthy model of art repatriation due to its success in
repatriating a substantial amount of its cultural property. Italy’s success can
be accredited to various factors including: legal and non-legal strategies-especially its long history of protecting cultural property; 139 a combination
of laws that regulate exports and vest Italy with ownership interest in cultural
property; 140 Italy’s specialized police force, 141 which has also been
instrumental in repatriating cultural property, particularly through
investigating and obtaining critical evidence that lead to imposition of civil
sanctions, penal charges, and pressure for museums to form repatriation
agreements; 142 and, lastly, Italy’s ability to cooperate with other
governments and foreign museums alike. 143
Italy’s cooperation with foreign governments and museums has taken
various forms. For example, Italy has brought successful claims in the
United States under the NSPA. 144 Additionally, as mentioned above, the
CPIA, authorizes the United States to enter into bilateral agreements with
other countries to impose import restrictions on cultural items coming into
the United States. After petitioning for such restrictions, Italy entered into a
Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”), 145 which forbids the importation
of certain cultural property from Italy while it agrees, inter alia, to use its
best efforts to facilitate loans and research opportunities with American
museums and universities. 146 Notably, the United States has only entered
into these kinds of agreements with a limited number of countries. 147
139. Silver, supra note 112, at 20.
140. Id. at 22 (stating Italy’s that combination of export regulations and state
ownership is powerful).
141. Id. at 40 (discussing how the Italian military, the Carabinieri, through its
specialized police force—Tutela Patrimonio Culturale—has been instrumental in
investigating cultural property thefts, allowing the government to prosecute
individuals in Italy, bring claims in other countries, and forge agreements with
museums).
142. See Andrew Slayman, Recent Cases of Repatriation of Antiquities to Italy From
the United States, 7 INT’L J. CULTURAL PROP. 456, 456-60 (1998) (enumerating
several illustrations of the Carabinieri’s retrieval of cultural items from the United
States); Aaron K. Briggs, Comment, Consequences of the Met-Italy Accord for the
International Restitution of Cultural Property, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 623, 644 (2006)
(discussing the Carabinieri’s successful recovery of the Euphronios Krater from the
Metropolitan Museum of Art as a result of the considerable evidence collected by
the Italian police).
143. See Celestine Bohen, Old Rarities, New Respect: U.S. Works With Italy, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 28, 2001, at E1 (describing Italy’s five-year agreement with the United
States as “the first of its kind”).
144. See e.g., United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 134 (2d
Cir.1999) (affirming the trial court’s forfeiture order for a Phiale of Sicilian origin).
145. See Silver, supra note 112, at 42 (discussing the implementation and the recent
extension of the MOU).
146. Id. at 37.
147. United States Implementation of the 1970 UNESCO Convention: The Convention
on Cultural Property Implementation Act, ARCHAEOLOGICAL INSTITUTE OF
AMERICA,
http://www.archaeological.org/pdfs/sitepreservation/CPAC_OverviewAIA.pdf
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In addition to Italy’s willingness to enter into agreements like the MOUs
with foreign governments, Italy is recognized for its cooperative agreements
with museums for the return of its cultural property. 148 These agreements
are voluntary, and unlike the MOUs previously described, they are entered
into through a non-legal avenue. 149 Furthermore, the agreements allow for
mutually beneficial outcomes where Italy negotiates to get its cultural
property back from the museums and, in return, the museums negotiate
future loans and research opportunities. 150
One such example—of a successful voluntary agreement—is Italy’s
request for return of the Euphronios Krater from the Met. The Euphronios
Krater was purchased in 1972 by the Met from Robert Hecht. Italy would
face difficulties in court because much of this case depended on whether the
Met knew that the Euphronios Krater was stolen under the NSPA. 151
Consequently, in February 2006, the Met and the Italian Ministry of Culture
signed an agreement, 152 which allowed for the return of the Euphronios
Krater, along with other objects, in exchange for long-term loans of works
of art of equal value. 153 These types of voluntary agreements not only give
Italy considerable bargaining power, but they also provide a platform to
nurture a spirit of cooperation between source countries—like Italy and
Turkey—and American museums. 154
The case of Italy highlights important factors that Turkey should take
into consideration and could use as a model to further its own repatriation
efforts. Expending more resources and effort in gathering evidence and
documentation, like Italy’s Carabinieri specialized art force, which would
provide the necessary evidence to strengthen Turkey’s claims and
delegitimize museum’s possession of these antiquities. Ultimately, any of
Turkey’s claims should be contingent on the particular circumstances of the

148.

149.
150.
151.

152.
153.

154.

(last visited Nov. 1, 2013) (that in over “the twenty-seven years that the CPIA has
been in effect, the United States has entered into bilateral agreements with only
thirteen nations: El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, Peru, Bolivia,
Mali, Italy, Canada, Cambodia, Colombia, Cyprus and China.”).
See Briggs, supra note 142, at 642 (recognizing that the call for cooperation
between Italy and the Met was a novel approach to restitution claims); Paige S.
Goodwin, Comment, Mapping the Limits of Repatriable Cultural Heritage: A Case
Study of Stolen Flemish Art in French Museums, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 690
(2008) (stating that the Italy-Met Accord set new standards in nations’ abilities to
make ethical and political claims against museums and would “pave the road for
new legal and ethical norms.”).
Silver, supra note 112, at 43.
Id. at 44-45.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2315 (2012) (requiring that under the NSPA, a party may seek
forfeiture if the possessor of the stolen property had knowledge of its status as being
stolen).
See The Metropolitan Museum of Art-Republic of Italy Agreement, Feb. 21, 2006
(establishing long term loans to the Met in exchange for the Euphronios Krater).
Id. (listing the terms of the agreement between the Met and the Republic of Italy,
including the purpose of the agreement, the requested items and the terms of future
loans).
See Briggs, supra note 142, at 623-24 (discussing the impact of the Met-Republic
of Italy agreement).
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case and the kind of documentation available to support its position.
However, a focus on evidentiary efforts, to the extent possible, could prompt
the United States and museums to work with Turkey in a more cooperative
manner.
Turkey could also benefit from entering into voluntary agreements with
museums. If Turkey were to take a more cooperative stance with the Met and
other museums, these museums would likely engage in kind, which would
ideally result in a mutually beneficial agreement. For example, the Dallas
Museum of Art, after uncovering evidence that certain antiquities in its
possession were in fact looted from Turkey, engaged with Turkey to
negotiate an agreement for the return of these antiquities. 155 What is
significant is that the Dallas Museum did not wait for Turkey to approach it
about the antiquities, but rather took the initiative upon itself. 156
Consequently, the Dallas Museum was able to negotiate an agreement that
benefitted both parties. A similar mutually beneficial repatriation agreement
was reached with the University of Pennsylvania. 157 These mutually
beneficial repatriation agreements require Turkey to recognize that it cannot
seek to repatriate every piece of antiquity it believes belongs in Turkey.
Instead, for those pieces that it seeks to repatriate, Turkey must be able to
provide museums with compelling evidence or incentives such as generous
loan or research agreements.

CONCLUSION
As it stands, Turkey’s request for repatriation from the Met regarding
the items in the Schimmel collection, should be denied because Turkey is
basing its claim strictly on moral grounds and lacks evidence to prove that
these antiquities were taken from Turkey. The basis for Turkey’s claims
place a risky burden and unwarranted challenges on many museums.
Instead, in seeking the return of its antiquities from the Met and other
museums, Turkey should focus its efforts on gathering evidence and
documentation to support its claims. This approach has worked particularly
well for Italy and played a crucial role in the return of the Euphronious Krater
and the Weary Hercules. Additionally, Turkey’s approach should not
publicly shame museums it believes to have Turkish pieces. Instead, Turkey
should pressure museums to return artifacts by providing museums with
documentation as well as incentives. This will give Turkey more credibility
155. Jason Felch, Dallas Museum of Art Returns Orpheus Mosaic, Five Other Looted
Treasures in Announcing New Art Loans Initiative, CHASING APHRODITE (Dec. 3,
2012),
http://chasingaphrodite.com/2012/12/03/dallas-museum-of-art-returnsorpheus-mosaic-five-other-looted-treasures-in-announcing-new-art-loansinitiative/ (noting that the Dallas Museum of Art signed an agreement for the return
of the Orpheus Mosaic).
156. Id.
157. Tom Avril, Penn Museum Makes Deal with Turkey for ‘Troy Gold,’ PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZZETTE
(Sept.
9,
2012),
http://www.postgazette.com/stories/local/state/penn-museum-makes-deal-with-turkey-for-troygold-652494/#ixzz2FXJcM4sO (reporting that the University of Pennsylvania lent
looted antiquities to Turkey for an indefinite period).
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in the future and make museums more likely to honor Turkey’s repatriation
requests. Lastly, Turkey should attempt to reach mutually beneficial
repatriation agreements like the ones reached with the Dallas Museum of Art
and the University of Pennsylvania. These agreements have proven
successful for Italy and may also be so for Turkey.
While Turkey’s efforts to collect its cultural property to support and
display its Turkish identity are admirable, it should operate within the
framework of the international agreements it has signed, such as the
UNESCO Convention. And when these agreements are insufficient to meet
Turkey’s needs, it should use the aforementioned strategies to foster a more
cooperative and successful repatriation strategy. Only then will Turkey’s
efforts be respected and provide a sustainable and successful framework for
preserving its cultural heritage.
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